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Recently, ubiquitous computing and pervasive environments evolved tremendously and
became an integral part of many fields and application domains. This is widely attributed
to their seamless integration with many everyday components and efficiency in handling
business and personal tasks. As a result, technologies to facilitate their development,
integration and security also evolved.Middleware is an essential layer in the architecture of
these new systems, and recently,more emphasis has beenput on securitymiddleware as an
enabling component for ubiquitous applications. This is due to the high levels of personal
and private data sharing in these systems. In this paper, we review some representative
securitymiddleware approaches and highlight their various properties, characteristics, and
challenges. The review reveals that several options are available; however, there are still
many issues and challenges to be addressed to achievemore efficient securitymiddleware.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Middleware is a software layer residing on top of the operating system that connects different software components or
applications. It provides interoperability and other services like the distribution of functionality, scalability, load balancing
and fault tolerance [1]. The functionalities of middleware fall within three general categories which are application-specific,
information-exchange,management and support. The application-specificmiddleware delivers services for different ranges
of applications such as distributed-database services, distributed transaction processing, and specialized services for mobile
computing and multimedia, while the information-exchange middleware deals mainly with information management. The
management and support middleware is used to communicate with servers, manage security, handle failures, and monitor
performance [2].
Middleware can be classified according to the way each middleware either assists an application or helps with the
integration of multiple applications or application components. Each middleware has different communication protocols
and modes of operation. It includes different types such as Procedure Oriented Middleware, Object Oriented Middleware,
Message OrientedMiddleware, Component Based or ReflectiveMiddleware and Agents [3]. Moreover, middleware provides
security mechanisms for many applications. Security became an important issue because most transactions and operations
occur online and need data transmission. The applications and data involved need to be protected from malicious and
unintentional attacks as well as from any possible risks of exposure. Well defined access polices, encryption mechanisms
and authentication models can help in providing security.
Pervasive computing refers to the ubiquitous presence of computing in both mobile and embedded environments, with
the ability to access and update information anywhere, anyplace and anytime [4].
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In similar lines, ubiquitous computing, often abbreviated to ‘‘ubicomp’’, refers to a new genre of computing in which
the computer completely infuses in the life of the user [5]. This kind of computing is considered as the third generation
of computing where computers are seen everywhere but at the same time they are unseen because the devices are highly
embedded, natural, and friendly. Therefore, users use them without even noticing. In ubiquitous computing, computers
become a helpful but invisible force, assisting the user in meeting his or her needs without getting in the way [6]. Pervasive
devices are becoming very popular and less expensive these days, with which different devices like smart mobile phones
and PDAs can interact easily. Ubiquitous computing can be used in many applications such as health care, home care,
transportation and environmental monitoring. Therefore, pervasive devices may have important implications for privacy,
security and safety because of their ability to gather sensitive data, as well as retrieve and use information from large
databases. Furthermore, these devices contain limited resources. Consequently, they can have difficulties supporting the
computational needs for security functions. The openwireless connectivity is another challenge in the pervasive computing
systems, putting the users and the system resources under susceptible threats. As a result, middleware could be used to
provide security and protect users from privacy violation and data leakage.
Middleware is used to support integration and interoperability among ubiquitous computing elements, and recently it
has also become important in providing security for ubiquitous computing. In this paper, we explore different security
middleware projects and approaches devised to provide different security measures for ubiquitous applications and
pervasive environments. We summarize their contributions and discuss the approaches used to secure the systems.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of security middleware and
some relatedwork. In Section 3, we discuss themain characteristics and requirements of securitymiddleware for ubiquitous
computing and in Section 4 we review some current security middleware approaches. In Section 5 we present a discussion
of the reviewed approaches and compare the characteristics they incorporate. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background and related work
Since middleware handles all the communications between a client and the target application, it can also mask all the
underlying complexities including the security aspects. The security is enforced within the middleware by utilizing many
security features such as authentication where identities are verified, credentials are handled, messages are protected
from unauthorized modifications and disclosure, and access control policies are managed and audited for accountability.
These security features are all integrated in a way that preserves the main functionalities of the middleware and fits
into its structure. The positioning of the security functionalities in the middleware architecture lies in the layers below
the client application to maintain abstraction, portability and automation. Access control and audit policies all should
be positioned in the middleware layer as this helps in achieving interoperability by segregating it from the underlying
technologies. Additionally, if cryptography is needed then it would be ideally implemented in the underlying technology
layer to achieve flexibility and interoperability [7]. As a result of the security advantages it provides; security middleware
has been widely adopted in many diversified systems such as e-commerce, web access, grid computing and Internet data
storage. For example, iDataGuard [8] is a middleware that provides a Secure Network Drive Interface to Untrusted Internet
Data Storage; and FAME-PERMIS [9] is an Authentication Middleware which supports UbiquitousWeb Access. Furthermore,
security middleware has been a thriving research area to combat the continuous security issues in sensitive areas such as
mobile ad hoc, pervasive/ubiquitous, and peer-to-peer (P2P) computing.More detailswill be given in the upcoming sections.
A survey ofmiddleware paradigms formobile computing [10] presented several researchprojects that have been initiated
to address the dynamic aspects of mobile distributed systems. The authors argue that traditional middleware approaches
such as CORBA and Java RMI have worked properly for a long time in dealing with heterogeneity and interoperability but
they fail to provide the appropriate support formodernmobile applications. One of the several mentioned new technologies
is the Event-Based Paradigm. This paradigm supports the development of large scale distributed systems by facilitating
a highly decoupled approach and many-to-many interaction style between client and server. Another research that has
been conducted and took a similar approach surveys middleware for mobile ad hoc networks [11]. Here the authors
present middleware approaches and solutions for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) by making a comparison between
their features, and ends the paper with a list of required functionalities for MANET middleware, and the ones that haven’t
been addressed efficiently in themiddleware approaches thatwere surveyed. One of thesemiddleware approaches is Selma,
a mobile agent based middleware that provides functionalities such as positioning, neighborhood discovery and wireless
communication. The paper is concluded by arguing that there is still not a complete middleware solution that covers all
the desired functionalities for a middleware in order to work as needed in the MANET environment especially concerning
security aspects and resource management. Another article surveys middleware approaches providing context-awareness
in ubiquitous computing [12]. Here the authors evaluate the performance of the present middleware solutions specific to
ubiquitous computing requirements. The authors identify the key requirements that should be present by studying the
relevant literature and best known projects such as MIT’s Oxygen and the GAIA project. Again, the main conclusion is that
there are yet many challenges that were not addressed especially concerning privacy and security. Our survey and study
focuses solely on security middleware solutions in an attempt to find out what is currently available and what are the main
issues and challenges in the field. We will try to use the survey as a starting point to initiate more in-depth investigations
of the unsolved problems and provide a roadmap to those interested in pursuing research that is targeted towards efficient
and workable security middleware solutions for ubiquitous computing.
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Fig. 1. Middleware support for ubiquitous applications.
3. Characteristics of security middleware
Before detailing the different approaches and solutions researchers propose to secure ubiquitous computing and
pervasive environments via middleware, we will explore the main characteristics of such solutions. As we studied the
different approaches in securitymiddleware, it was clear that several issues and directions have been addressed by different
researchers. However, in the particular area of ubiquitous computing, there are some important aspects that security
middleware share. In addition, there are also certain issues that still need to be more thoroughly investigated and resolved.
To clearly understand the unique requirements of security middleware for ubiquitous computing, it is important to first
highlight the main differentiating characteristics of ubiquitous computing and pervasive environments. One of the most
representative definitions is stated in [13]: ‘‘The promise of ubiquitous computing is of a life in which our endeavours
are powerfully, though subtly, assisted by computers’’. The definition says it all, we need power and intelligence, but we
must not see it. When dealing with ubiquitous applications, the main issue involved is how to make the application and
the devices used to support it as invisible from the user as possible yet as readily accessible as possible. It is important to
support several needs such as mobility, heterogeneity, seamless interfaces, efficient operations, anywhere/anytime access
to information and applications, and secure access and utilization. The user of such applications should not be bothered by
how services are designed and where they reside. The user should be able to access any service anywhere, anytime and at
the same time be assured of the security and integrity of the system and data being used. Several operational issues have
been addressed and efficiently resolved, yet the security issues remain a big obstacle hindering large-scale acceptance and
utilization of ubiquitous applications. The main issues that must be addressed in terms of security are:
1. Authentication mechanisms and credential management
2. Authorization and access control management
3. Shared data security and integrity
4. Secure one-to-one and group communication
5. Heterogeneous security/environment requirements support
6. Secure mobility management
7. Capability to operate in devices with low resources
8. Automatic configuration and management of these facilities.
These issues can be addressed independently with each ubiquitous application being developed. However, this approach
creates several problems: (1) Developers will need to be aware of these issues and skilled enough to design and implement
suitable solutions; (2) each application might repeat many similar functionalities as other applications, which would be a
waste of time and effort; (3) applications will increase in size and functionality and most likely will have a larger footprint
which makes them hard to port onto small devices. As shown in Fig. 1, the use of middleware can solve these problems
by providing an independent layer to support the security aspects. In this case, the common functions and application-
independent features can all be part of the middleware. Any application requiring their use can be implemented using the
proper API, and would be able to use those functions directly. As a result, such new applications would be more efficient.
Additionally, less time and effort will be spent trying to secure each application separately. Several researchers tried to
address these issues and provide security middleware to support these functionalities. However, most proposed solutions
tackle only a few of these issues at a time. Among the different projects we surveyed, none of them provides a complete
approach.
4. Security middleware approaches
In this sectionwe discuss examples of securitymiddleware used for pervasive and ubiquitous applications. The list below
is not complete, but it is a representative of the latest research directions in this field. In addition, the selected examples show
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the different areas and application domains involved in delivering truly ubiquitous applications. This includes seamless and
secure access to wireless devices and applications, storage and data sources, and powerful computing resources.
4.1. iDataGuard [8]
This is a middleware that was designed at The University of California and Brigham Young University. It provides a
secure network drive interface to untrusted Internet data storage. iDataGuard is an interoperable security middleware
that addresses both heterogeneity and security issues with regard to Internet Data Storage Providers (IDP). In spite of IDPs
success, this technology is still restrained with some limitations. One is trust, as the data is stored in plain text which makes
it vulnerable to malicious attacks, and the other is the lack of standard protocol for the interface design of the IDP services.
iDataGuard was developed to mask the heterogeneity of the interfaces and handle the security requirements.
iDataGuard lies within a secure network drive that can be built over any of the IDPs; it runs on the client machine to
provide the data services to the users. The Architecture of the middleware consists of the following components: When the
application running on behalf of the user outsources a file, the file is translated into an abstract data model by the Data
Translator (DT). This abstract model models objects and encompasses the data models of a variety of IDPs. The objects are
secured cryptographically by the Crypto module using a master password from the client. The fetching and storing of the
objects is done by the service adapters which are IDP specific modules. All the file system operations are issued by the
application to the iDataGuard. The operation translation (OT) translates them into abstract operation modules that are a set
of generic operations suiting a variety of IDPs. There is also the index generator component that generates a cryptographic
index for all the outsourced textual files. The core elements of the iDataguard are its ability to adapt to heterogeneity, its
security model and the ability to search encrypted data. The security model offers confidentiality and integrity of the user’s
data using cryptographic techniques. These techniques conceal all file content, metadata and structure of the file systems
and do not reveal any of this information to the server.
4.2. AMUWA [9]
An approach for authenticationmiddleware to support ubiquitous web access designed at The University of Manchester,
UK. It is a middleware extension used to secure ubiquitous data access throughWeb services. It addresses security by using
a combination of different types of authentication methods according to different places. Therefore, the middleware uses
different levels of authentication according to the location of the user at the time when the service request is issued. This
middleware tries to tackle some issues regarding authentication in which the support of heterogeneous authentication
and authorization mechanisms is needed. The access control policy plays a great role in the strength of the authorization
and authentication provided to access specific services. Moreover, the support of user roaming is necessary to allow a user
who is working away from home to be authenticated without the need for a technology that uses stringent authentication
procedures.
The middleware is based on FAME-PERMIS (Flexible Access Middleware Extensions to PERMIS) which is intended to
ease multi-factor authentication as well as authentication strength that supports a wide collection of methods including
IP addresses, username and password pairs, certificate-based soft tokens, Java cards and biometrics. As a result, the user
will have the freedom to choose any combination of authentication methods to reach a high level of assurance (LOA).
FAME contains three main components which are: the Authentication Token Manager (ATM), the Device Manager (DM)
and the Network Manager (NM). The middleware tries to follow a standard that will define the strength and the level of the
authentication method using the NIST standard that defines four levels of authentication strength.
4.3. TMAHP2P [14]
A trust-based middleware for providing security to ad hoc P2P applications developed at Carlos III University of Madrid.
The authors present a trust-based middleware and WSFEP file exchange protocol. Their middleware is used for securing
digital content that can be shared between pervasive devices. In addition, the middleware is also used for providing flexible
security services to the applications used in these devices. There aremany advantages associatedwith thismiddleware. This
middleware performs an autonomous trust management and eliminates the complexity of establishing a new trust-based
relationship with other devices. Moreover, it reduces the dependency on a central server and eliminates the need of manual
settings. Therefore, any device can participate in a P2P application in a secure way.
The middleware is designed to be open and extensible. Its architecture consists of three layers: the trust layer, security
layer and application layer. All the three layers are connected through an access control based on XACML-compliant policies
that will grant or deny access to the resources. The trust layer holds a trust manager used to handle four processes:
specification, establishment,monitoring, and trust termination. The security layer also contains the authenticationmanager,
communication API, Cryptographic provider and credentials manger. The application layer contains an application that is
developed using the Wireless and Secure File Exchange Protocol (WSFEP). The application goes through two phases which
are discovery and exchange. In discovery, devices can recognize the environment around them and the available files for
exchange while in exchange, the actual exchange of files occurs. File exchange is done in either one of two modes: efficient
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or secure. In the efficient mode, files are transmitted without applying any security mechanisms, while in the secure mode
files are signed, encrypted, or both.
4.4. SGSC [15]
Secure group communication service is a middleware service for mobile ad hoc networks developed at Arizona State
University. This middleware provides flexible secure group management. It also supports the development and execution
of distributed applications. Mobile ad hoc networks impose more requirements for secure group communication due to
the limited capabilities of the members and their mobility. SGSC was implemented using a context-sensitive middleware
approach and consists of three components: SGCS Daemon (to create and manage services), Group Services (created on
the devices to provide core functionality), and SGSC API (used by the distributed applications to utilize secure group
functionality). To develop and execute distributed applications using SGCS, the following steps are needed:
1. Develop a distributed application with secure group communication using RCSMmiddleware.
2. Identify the members of each secure group that are required by the distributed application.
3. After running the distributed application, the secure groupswill be automaticallymanaged by the SGCS to support secure
communication among the group members.
4.5. SMMU [16]
SMMU is a security management middleware designed for ubiquitous computing environments. It allows the
administrator to define the needed security policies and provides management services to monitor and control the
interconnected devices. This middleware architecture is focused on providing trust management services and supporting
real-time mobile application scenarios. Some of its advantages are providing authentication between connected devices,
checking the permissions, andmonitoring the activities of the connected devices. Its architecture consists of five components
which are the following: (1) the policy manger used to define rules for access control, confidentiality, and availability
of resources and stored information, (2) the object manager used to monitor and control target objects (devices), (3) the
context manager which collects the contexts and aggregates the data to be sent to the status monitoring manger, (4) the
Status monitoring manger which collects the status information to send it to the database manager, (5) the authentication
manager which uses X.509 credential for identification.
4.6. SSMAP [17]
This is a security-supportive middleware architecture designed to serve mainly heterogeneous pervasive devices. It is
provided with a trust manager that offers dynamic reconfiguration to fulfil the security requirements of heterogeneous
service providers and consumers. The main advantages are that its structure depends on reconfigurable and on-demand
assembled security components that cooperate with each other; and trust management is linked with many services like
authentication, trust negotiation, trust maintenance and access control techniques that govern the relationship between
devices in pervasive computing systems. The architecture relies on a virtual server where a user can find all the provided
services. The application layer lies on top and includes both the service consumer and provider applications while the
proposed security middleware resides in the middleware layer. It provides on-demand assembled security components
like encryption and intrusion detection. In SSMAP, trust management is dedicated to support establishing and maintaining
trust between applications and different devices.
Authentication is only deployed when the user has an existing profile stored in the pervasive computing space from
previous transactions to claim and prove identity. Therefore, a stranger will get lower levels of access to the resources.
However, access control follows the traditional mandatory access control approach (MAC) where each service is assigned
with a sensitivity level that dynamically changes according to the variations of the environment. To use the service, the user
level has to be equal or higher than the requested service level. Trust negotiation works in parallel when a profile is not
established or is not available. It has six elements which are privacy protector, negotiation procedure generating engine,
dynamic trust policies, situation sensor, un-trusted execution and monitoring protection, and repository management.
Another component is Trust maintenance that is used after authentication and trust negotiation are completed. It handles
both monitoring and managing trust between the user and the service.
4.7. MSHAC [18]
This is a middleware for secure home access and control in home automation designed at University Carlos III of Madrid,
University of Paderborn/C-Lab of Paderborn and Cirosec GmbH. This middleware can help broaden the proliferation of
ambient technology among regular non-tech savvy users. The main obstacle with these technologies is the lack of trust
and acceptance from users due to possible intrusion and unauthorized access to private data. Therefore, ‘‘Secure Service
Middleware’’ provides secure management of user and context data. It provides access to services only for the authorized
users and devices.
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A distributed architecture has been chosen for this middleware, as well as the adoption of SSL/TLS based communication
to guarantee security aspects. Furthermore, mutual authentication between communication partners is required with the
use of a challenge-response protocol that verifies a component identity based on its public keys. The four components of
the architecture are:
1. Devices and Services, where devices request services and services contact Trust Manager to check for authorization.
2. Trust Manager which is used to issue authorization with the help from Credential and Authentication manager. This is
done using a DSA signature scheme to prevent forgery and tampering.
3. Authentication Manager that handles the authentication of devices in order to meet the requirements of the different
security levels.
4. CredentialManagerwhich is used to retrieve credentials in the formof an access control list from the credentials database.
The list contains the security level for a specific user and service combination.
The implementation of thismiddleware is basedon theprofile database schemaand JCCM(JavaCardCertificateManager).
A flexible data schema has been designed that supports several data types and formats, incorporates security features (all
the data in database is encrypted) and allows distribution among different databases. A key feature in the JCCM design is the
cardlet that handles the management layer in Cryptoki objects, implementing the full management functionality defined
in Cryptoki from creation, lookup, copy, deletion of objects, and cryptographic functions. A second feature is the dynamic
memory management in smart cards. This is a simple memory management layer that was designed for this issue as the
Cryptoki object management functions need to allocate and free memory.
4.8. TDAMU [19]
This is a trust-based distributed authenticationmiddleware in ubiquitousmobile environments developed at South China
Agricultural University and National Laboratory for Modern Communications. It is a middleware designed to support role-
based trust and accountability in distributed mobile environments. It uses trust-based frameworks that add a security layer
for data sharing, permissionmanagement, access control and right delegation issues. Themiddleware has many advantages
such as its support for the role-based trust in which roles can be assigned to a group of mobile objects which will ease the
management of security polices. The role-based trust model consists of four objects that are used for authentication which
are the following: (1) Truster module which represents the party who will make a decision whether to trust or not trust the
other party (trustee), (2) the Trustee is the party who will be under the evaluation of trust that is handled by the Truster,
(3) Trust credentials in which each trustee has certifications signed by other parties, (4) the trust policy used to assure that
the trustees’ credentials comply with the trust policy. Moreover, authorization is considered as an advantage by having an
identity for each node which can be a public key, an e-mail address, a CPU or a hard drive serial number, or an IP address.
Another major advantage is the separation of the trust-based authentication module logic and the application logic which
will facilitate the customization of both logics.
The Framework used to implement the middleware consists of three layers: middleware authentication, secure
communication, and trusted proof. When a mobile middleware wants to communicate with another mobile middleware,
they have to be authenticated by going through the middleware authentication layer which will establish an interaction
between the trust proof layer and the requester to filter trusted requests from other requests. While in the secure
communication layer, only authenticated middleware can communicate, and abstraction is used to handle the complexity
and heterogeneity of different parties. The trusted proof layer handles the main tasks such as modifying the trust policies,
searching credentials, and trust proofing.
4.9. DMW [20]
This is a middleware for digital rights management (DRM) developed at Satyam Computer Services Limited, India. It is
designed to enforce DRM in P2P-like networks having mobile and stationary devices. It was developed to tackle the present
challenges in P2P networks regarding contentmanagement. DMWaddresses DRM enforcement aspects and content sharing
through super-distribution. The proposedmiddleware is based on amulti-tiered architecture consisting of different service-
oriented layers.
DMW is a network oriented middleware that resides in each peer device. It acts as a facilitator for value-added services
with access control and copy control during content rendering and distribution. DMW follows a balanced decentralized
approach to meet the objectives of P2P content sharing and revenue generation with a reasonable amount of restriction.
It also has the ability to address issues related to interoperability, compatibility, trustworthiness, content manageability
and support for protected content distribution. The DMW multi-tier architecture contains three layers: (1) Upper Tier: an
application level that provides services to an application for interpreting the rights and rendering the secure content. It
contains three service layers: User Services, DRM Services and Directory Services, (2) Middle Tier: an operating system (OS)
level that provides DMW specific extensions to the OS that help track illegal use of content. This tier contains two layers:
Device Services and Transmission Services, (3) Lower Tier: a hardware level that is used for rights enforcement.
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4.10. S-MARKS [21]
This is a securemiddleware designed for portable devices in a pervasive computing environment. It incorporates features
to address important issues such as device validation, discovering resources, malicious recommendations and privacy
violations. According to the authors, available middleware have failed to address these issues in a one-stop solution. The
importance of this approach lies in that sharing services among portable devices has been subject to distrust with the
available security concerns in pervasive computing environments. That is why a single solution is proposed that may
enhance the ability to be adopted by mobile devices. The four main mechanisms presented in this approach are:
1. Valid Device Discovery, which restricts the interaction to only valid devices with the use of a challenge-response
mechanism.
2. Trust Based Resource Discovery, which is based on a trust table in each device containing the services available by the
neighboring nodes with a corresponding trust value that can be upgraded dynamically.
3. Handling Malicious Recommendation to minimize their effects on overall recommendations.
4. Avoiding Privacy Violation related to resource sharing.
5. Discussion and open issues
As we explored the different approaches in security middleware, it was clear that several issues and directions have
been addressed by different researchers. However, in the particular area of ubiquitous computing, there are some important
aspects that are shared by various security middleware designs. Table 1 summarizes some of the main features and issues
involved. In this section, we review the different characteristics (as described in Section 3) that each of the reviewed security
middleware approaches covers. We also discuss how these approaches satisfy a number of security requirements.
5.1. Support for authentication
Authentication in this context includes several factors such as credentialsmanagement, trustmanagement and the actual
process of ensuring the correct identity of the user, device or group. All the studied approaches support authentication and
some mechanisms to establish and use trust among the different nodes/devices in the system. DMW is the only exception
since it is mainly concerned with digital rights management. In addition, the iDataGaurd implicitly supports authentication
as part of file security support. Based on the descriptions of these approaches, several mechanisms were used to support
authentication including trust-based models, group authentication, and credentials management. The main problem here
is the initial establishment of trust. The authors in [22] investigated the issues involved for mobile ad hoc networks and
the general conclusion was that establishing trust is the hardest step to perform. This is mostly specific to pervasive
environments that do not have a central authority to support the process.
5.2. Support for authorization and access control
The second issue involves supporting authorization and access control policies. Here, when a device or a user is
authenticated, the correct set of rules that apply to this particular entity should be enforced. Any securitymiddleware should
be able to provide this functionality through policy management models. Several of the projects implicitly support the
process. However, only a few explicitly describe how their approach does that. For example, AMUWA controls data access
among pervasive nodes and web services, and provides access control management features. Another example is SMMU
which allows the system administrator to define and enforce authorization and access control policies. SSMAP supports the
process through a virtual server designed to support trust negotiation, and access control. Furthermore, TDAMU supports
this feature using a role-based trust to support groups of mobile devices in a ubiquitous system. It handles authentication
at the middleware level. Therefore, any device carrying the authenticated middleware will be granted proper access based
on the defined policies. Finally, DMW provides P2P systems with digital rights management features to facilitate access and
copy control for shared data.
5.3. Shared data security and integrity
This feature involves securing the data used and shared within a ubiquitous system, which is extremely important in
many applications such as in health care, home automation, and military operations. Only two of the projects we studied
address this issue explicitly. The first is iDataGaurd which provides a generic secure data sharing model. The approach used
relies on having the security middleware reside on the client host and supports encryption and digital signatures such that
all client data and files will be secure and hidden even from the server. This approach is very efficient since each client will
be responsible for its own data security and the server will not be overloaded with this process. However, this imposes high
requirements on the client host to be able to support the encryption and other security features. As a result, this will be
suitable for the larger end devices and stationary devices that have access to reasonable resources. Another project support-
ing secure data is MSHAC, which provides a feature to encrypt all entries in the database of the system. This again requires
having at least one host in the home network that has high processing capabilities and good power supply to store and
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Table 1
Summary of the security middleware approaches.
Approach Target environment Issues addressed Security mechanisms Other features Remarks
iDataGuard [8] Secure network drive
interface for untrusted
Internet data storage.
Data security and
integrity,
heterogeneity &
mobility.a
Confidentiality &
integrity using
cryptography and a
client master
password.
Client file system
operations done by
service adapters (IDP
service modules).
Generated encrypted
index for all
outsourced files.
Limited to file
storage provided by
IDPs.
AMUWA [9] Ubiquitous data access
through Web Services.
Authentication, access
control, data security &
mobility.
Fine-grained access
control for Grid
environments.
Supports user roaming.
Offers four levels of
authentication.
Provides security for
a popular access
service. Limited
applications using
web services.
TMAHP2P [14] Developed for wireless
secure file exchange
protocol (WSFEP) for
ad hoc P2P networks.
Authentication, access
control, heterogeneity,
automation, mobility,a
data securitya & low
resources.a
Autonomous trust
management. Three
layers: trust
management, security,
and access control
File sharing application
Implemented using
J2ME Personal Profile.
Two modes of
exchange: efficient,
and secure.
Implemented and
tested on PDAs
(limited testing).
SGSC [15] Security support for
group communication
in mobile ad hoc
networks.
Authentication, group
communication,
mobility, automation &
low resources.a
Automated secure
group communication
features.
Adding and deleting
group members is
done automatically by
the middleware.
Flexible group
management,
reduced number
operations in each
device.
SMMU [16] Security management
for ubiquitous
computer environment
Authentication, access
control, low resources
& data security.a
Services to define
security policies in a
dynamic context and
trust management.
Five security
management
components: policy,
object, context, status
monitoring, and
authentication.
Implemented in
CORBA. Provides
credential
management
services.
SSMAP [17] Security management
middleware for
ubiquitous
environments.
Authentication, access
control, heterogeneity
& data security.a
Reconfigurable
on-demand
components.
Mandatory access
control with dynamic
sensitivity levels.
Virtual server provides
on-demand assembled
security components
(e.g. encryption &
intrusion detection)
and reconfigurable
services.
Not implemented
and tested in a real
platform yet.
MSHAC [18] Secure access and
control for home
automation. Operates
over TCP/IP, IEEE
802.11, or Bluetooth.
Authentication, access
control,a low resources
& data securitya
Different
authentication
methods (fingerprint,
card, password, etc.)
with different security
levels.
Context and user
profile used for
authorization provide
more intelligent and
secure location-based
services.
Proposed
architecture
implemented as a
proof of concept and
tested.
TDAMU [19] Role-based, distributed
authentication for
ubiquitous
environments.
Authentication,
mobility, access
control,a group
communication,a low
resources,a
heterogeneity,a &
automation.a
Roles assigned to
groups of mobile
objects to ease
management of
security policies.
Defines four objects:
Truster, Trustee, Trust
credentials, & policy.
Security provided
through interactions of
three layers in each
mobile device.
Unified scheme to
provide middleware
security among
ubiquitous nodes.
DMW [20] Enforces digital right
management (DRM) in
P2P –like networks
with mobile and
stationary devices.
Authentication,a access
control, data security &
mobility.
Proposed for the
application layer,
operating system, and
hardware.
Provides a theoretical
framework focused on
DRM rule enforcement.
Offers services such as
content acquisition,
rights analysis, and
access/copy control.
No experimental
evaluation. It would
be useful to use as a
guideline in future
architectural
designs.
S-MARKS [21] Secure middleware for
pervasive computing
environments.
Authentication, access
control, mobility, low
resources, &
heterogeneity.a
Addresses device
validation, trust-based
resource discovery,
handling malicious
recommendations, and
preventing privacy
violations.
Device discovery is
based on
challenge/response/
recommendation of
the new node. Trust
model is reflexive and
partially transitive.
Implemented
prototype (on pocket
PC’s with C# on.NET
framework) with
device validation and
resource discovery.
a In the ‘‘Issues addressed’’ column, an issue marked with ‘‘a’’ means it is supported partially or as lower priority.
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use the encrypted database. Several other projects implicitly cover the issue through some supported features such as the
cryptographicmodule in TMAHP2P, an encryption feature in SSMAP and DMW that supports protected content distribution.
5.4. Secure group communication
In terms of secure communication, an implicit assumption of secure one-to-one communication is made for all projects.
However, only a couple of projects provide the necessary features to support secure group communication. SGSC is explicitly
designed for securing communication and data exchange within a group of devices. The middleware offers dynamic
mechanisms to provide authentication and context-sensitive group management. This allows for several devices/users
to form groups to communicate securely and exchange data among the group. TDAMU also supports secure group
communication through role-based policies that apply to groups or individual devices. Therefore, when a group is formed,
it is possible for the middleware to enforce one set of policies on all members of that group.
5.5. Heterogeneous security requirements
Here, heterogeneity relates to the different security requirements for devices and groups within a ubiquitous system.
It also relates to the changes of these requirements for any one or more device as these devices change location or change
processing needs. iDataGaurd, is one securitymiddleware that can support heterogeneity by residing on the client host. This
way, it adapts to the host’s need and locally manages all its data security requirements. AMUWA also handles heterogeneity
of security requirements and authentication needs based on the client’s location. This allows clients to dynamically change
security requirements and access policies based on the location where they access the system. The use of web services is a
key factor to enable this feature. SSMAP supports heterogeneous devices within the system, and MSHAC supports different
databases, devices and access requirements within the home network.
5.6. Secure mobility management
As a basic requirement security middleware should be able to function correctly for all devices within the ubiquitous
system regardless of its location and/or its mobility capabilities. Generally all the projects that are specifically targeted for
ad hoc networks and ubiquitous/pervasive systems support security functionalities in the presence of node mobility. The
only exception is MSHAC, which is designed for home automation networks and generally assumes a relatively stationary
environment. iDataGuard and SSMAP do not explicitly support mobility, but based on the security middleware design, it is
acceptable to infer that it is possible to do so.
5.7. Supporting devices with low resources
The general perception of ubiquitous computing is thatmany of the devices involvedwill be small sized devices designed
for specific functions and with relatively low levels of resources such as processing power, networking capabilities, and
power sources. As a result, it is important for the securitymiddlewaremodules to be able to operatewithin these limitations.
The projects designed specifically for ubiquitous computing are well adapted to this requirement. However, some other
projects like iDataGaurd and DMW require the middleware to reside on the system devices and performmost of their work
locally. This basically imposes higher requirements on these devices especially due to operations like trustmanagement and
encryption, which are generally resource intensive.
5.8. Support for automation
Regardless of the functionalities a security middleware provides, it is becoming very important to hide these from the
users. Therefore, it is necessary to minimize administration needs for these features. Thus security middleware should
have the capabilities for auto configuration and dynamic adaptation to changes in the environment, the topology or the
application requirements. TMAHP2P supports autonomous trust management and automatic policy management. SGSC
provides dynamic group management allowing it to automatically mange the nodes within each group. SSMAP supports
dynamic on-demand assembled security components based on the applications needs. MSHAC uses several software
managers that automatically deploy and enforce security policies in the system.
5.9. Comments
Security middleware is an important component, which provides security features in ubiquitous applications and
relevant supporting domains. However, to date, many of the available approaches provide a relatively limited set of required
features. Generally, most studied projects as well as many others concentrate mainly on authentication, authorization
and access control. Others address data security and integrity. Nevertheless, the majority of the projects studied (except
iDataGaurd, AMUWA and MSHAC) address this issue because it is doable within the context of the main solution approach.
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Although ubiquitous applications are not necessarily mobile, several domains require some mobility support, yet only
AMUWA, TDAMU, DMW and S-MARKS address it explicitly and provide a workable approach to support it. However, along
with their solutions,most of themdid not consider resource limitation as an issue. TDAMUand S-MARKSprovide lightweight
solutions that could be supported on low-resource devices, but the rest of the approaches are more resource-intensive
and may not be suitable for such devices. Furthermore, the remaining issues (e.g. heterogeneity, automation and group
communication) are still under investigation, and very few researchers have approached solutions for them.
From another perspective, when we compare the approaches presented here based on how well they cover the
different security issues, we identify TMAHP2P as the one approach that addresses most issues. It supports authentication,
authorization, access control, heterogeneity, and automation. In addition, it has some implicit coverage of three other
requirements: data security, mobility and low resources. Three other approaches follow closely. They are: AMUWA, SGSC
and S-MARKS. At the other end, iDataGaurd represents a very concentrated solution for the specific issue of securing data
and protecting its integrity. Consequently, this resulted in iDataGaurd being supportive of only data security, heterogeneity
and, to a certain extent, mobility.
As a result, all of the approaches are promising and many of them are successful and efficient, yet none of them can
solve all the issues combined. In fact, some of the issues involved conflict in their requirements. For example, supporting
low-resource devices makes it very hard to include computation, communication, or data intensive solutions such as
cryptography, distributed applications and file transfers. Consequently, strong data security and integrity is difficult to
achieve. One possible direction to solve this problem is to work on a modular middleware approach, where application
developers can mix and match different modules according to their applications needs and limitations. Designing the
middleware as separate and independent components each of which can support one of the issues involved would help
reduce the overhead. This would also allow developers more freedom to choose what they need, and customize the various
solutions to their application requirements.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we established a basic list of security requirements for ubiquitous systems. Then, we examined several
projects addressing different aspects of security middleware. We observed that different projects impose security in
the middleware in different ways. Some consider security by providing an efficient access control and authentication
methodology, while others emphasize providing the protection for the content shared on the network rather than the
access. In addition, a few projects present securitymiddleware for group communication and P2P networks to grant smooth
interaction between the connected devices. Different architectures and design approaches were used such as centralized
control, virtual server, distributed architecture, and secure client-based support.
Even though, most projects succeeded in implementing their proposed security middleware, it is not easy to provide
a fully-secured middleware that can combine all security components in a one-stop solution. At this stage, each approach
addresses a part of the problem and selectively solves some of the issues as needed by the target application domain. There
is no single securitymiddleware that could claim full protection for a pervasive or ubiquitous environment. Onemain reason
for this is that application requirements vary drastically depending on the domain and operating environment. As a result,
many of the requirements may conflict. For example, it is the nature of ubiquitous computing environments to include
devices that usually have limited resources; therefore, it is difficult to have an elaborate security middleware supporting all
features on these devices.
In our view, we envision a complete solution that is modular or has reconfigurable components that can be used
individually to construct a custom solution for a specific application or a group of applications with similar security
requirements. This way, it will be possible to optimize the functionality and tune the modules to closely match the
requirements without imposing any additional non-essential functions.
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